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IRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD: A VIEW FROM RIYADH 
By Lars Berger* 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the June 8-9, 2009 conference entitled “Israel and 
the Arab States: Parallel Interests, Relations, and Strategies,” jointly held in Jerusalem by the 
Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
Members of the new Israeli government have entertained the notion of an Israeli-Arab realignment 
vis-à-vis Iran. This article argues that such hopes are bound to be disappointed. They rest on a 
Realist understanding of Middle East international politics that fails to take into account the role 
domestic considerations and identity politics play in foreign policy decisionmaking. While Riyadh is 
undisputedly concerned about Iranian power projection in the region, improved relations with a U.S. 
administration that is more open to its concerns and an increasingly diverse set of international 
security links mean that it does not feel the need to endanger domestic and regional legitimacy by 
openly engaging Israel without any perceived progress along the parameters outlined in the 
Abdallah initiative of 2002. 
 
THE IMAGE OF A SHI’A THREAT 
 
Expectations about a broad regional 
realignment vis-à-vis Iran are very much 
rooted in Neo-Realist assumptions about the 
self-help nature of international politics and 
the irrelevance of domestic politics. In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, such a perspective could 
therefore assume a natural tendency to align 
with Israel. Set apart from other actors in the 
region by specific (complementary) military 
and economic strengths and weaknesses, both 
countries share a common link with the United 
States and a concern about revisionist regional 
powers like Egypt under Nasser, revolutionary 
Iran, or Iraq under Saddam Hussein.1 
It is thus no coincidence that the image of a 
moderate, i.e. pro-Western, block that 
transcends the issue of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has been reemerging for the last 
couple of decades. Washington policymakers 
toyed with that idea of a “strategic consensus” 
during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and 
suggested an “informal alliance” against 
“radical regimes” and “extremism” in the 
context of the President Clinton’s “dual 
containment.”2 
In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran, U.S. politicians and some academic 
observers had begun to differentiate between 
supposedly apolitical Sunni societies on the 
one hand and the supposedly violent, fanatic, 
and revolutionary feature of Shi’a Islam on the 
other. This allowed the autocratic governments 
in predominantly Sunni countries to portray 
the rising influence of militant Islamist groups 
as being the result of “foreign,” in particular 
“Shi’i” influences.3 
While Riyadh obviously had much cause 
for concern in the aftermath of the Islamic 
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War when Saudi 
security clashed with Iranian participants of 
the annual hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca,4 the 
most prominent case of Iranian support for 
Shi’i terrorist groups operating in Saudi 
Arabia constituted an attack not on Saudi 
targets, but on the U.S. airbase in Dahran in 
1996. With the attacks occurring in a time of 
Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, the leadership in 
Riyadh was even concerned about the negative 
repercussions possible U.S. military reprisals 
against Tehran might have. Nowadays, the 
idea of a “Shi’a threat” is more of a rhetorical 
device to express concerns linked to Saudi-
Iranian competition over the direction of 
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domestic politics in Iraq and Lebanon as well 
as Iran’s nuclear program.5 
In fact, the violent Islamist threat to Saudi 
internal security appears limited to Sunni 
groups. This does not mean, however, that Iran 
does not feature in Saudi perceptions of 
domestic stability at all. Concerns about 
Iranian support for al-Qa’ida have been 
noticeable ever since Riyadh began to take 
seriously its domestic violent Islamist 
opposition. At various stages of the current 
struggle, reports have surfaced suggesting 
links to Iran. For instance, in February 2003, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later 
become al-Qa’ida’s leader in Iraq, was 
reported to have met al-Qai’da’s then military 
commander Sayf al-Adil in Iran to plan not 
only the Islamist infiltration of Iraq after 
Saddam Hussein’s fall from power, but also to 
plot the terrorist attacks on Western housing 
compounds in Riyadh in May 2003.6 In 
February 2009, Saudi Arabia released a list of 
85 most wanted terrorists. Thirty-five of them 
were last seen in Iran with Saudi officials 
accusing one of them, Abdallah al-Qarawi, of 
being closely involved in much of the radical 
Islamist unrest in Saudi Arabia of recent years. 
According to the same report, al-Qa’ida cells 
in Iraq and Lebanon are directed by al-Qa’ida 
members residing in Iran.7 
Iran’s ability to use Saudi Arabia’s Shi’i 
population as leverage against Riyadh is 
curtailed by the fact that the Shi’a in Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia seek spiritual guidance from 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq (Najaf), 
and not from Iran.8 In fact, the religious 
leadership in Iran is increasingly concerned 
about Iraqi Shi’i centers of learning reasserting 
their traditional predominance in Shi’i Islam. 
Ironically, despite the current talk about Iran 
as the main beneficiary of Saddam Hussein’s 
fall from power, its strategic position might 
therefore still weaken over the long run. This 
would be the case in the event of a successful 
democratic experiment in Iraq, which could 
serve as an effective shield against Iranian 
“soft power” by providing a more attractive 
role model for Saudi and Bahraini Shi’a who 
share Arab ethnicity with their Iraqi 
coreligionists. 
At the same time, however, the scenario of 
Shi’i groups seeking to emulate peacefully 
their moderate coreligionists’ success in 
adapting to Iraq’s democratization poses 
another kind of challenge for authoritarian 
Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 
The image of a “Shi’a threat” and the specter 
of an “Iranian-dominated” opposition make it 
easier to justify vis-à-vis the West in general, 
and the United States in particular, slower 
progress with political reform or even a return 
to repression. 
This calculation played a role in the post-
2003 relationship between the House of Sa’ud 
and the Eastern province. In line with 
neoconservative ideas about the regional 
effects of Saddam Hussein’s fall, the political 
resurgence of Iraq’s Shi’a inspired their Saudi 
coreligionists. At a time when a number of 
other Arab Gulf countries began to engage 
with heavily controlled political reform 
measures intended--to some extent--to present 
themselves as stable, forward-looking bases 
for the U.S. strategic presence in the region, 
the political leadership in Riyadh saw itself 
confronted with the choice between greater 
repression or the accommodation of the 
expected increase in Shi’i demands for 
political autonomy.9 The widespread fear that 
Saudi Arabia itself could become a target of 
the “war on terror” and thus suffer the 
breakaway of the oil-rich Eastern province 
heavily populated by the country’s Shi’a 
minority meant that the latter were suddenly in 
danger of becoming the ”fifth column” not of 
Iran, but possibly of the United States.10 Then 
Crown Prince Abdallah thus decided to launch 
the so-called National Dialogue, which had as 
one of its aims the unprecedented discussion 
of religious differences.11 When Saudi Arabia 
took the historic step of holding its first 
municipal elections in more than 40 years in 
the context of free elections being held in Iraq 
in early 2005, voter participation in the 
Eastern provinces was--at only 40 percent--
twice as high as in Riyadh.  
For Michael Doran, these developments are 
linked with Abdallah’s belief in the notion of 
taqarub, i.e. the peaceful coexistence between 
Muslims and “non-Muslims,” a category that 
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in the strict Wahhabi interpretation covers the 
Shi’a as well. He contrasts this with the notion 
of tawhid, which denotes the call to focus on 
the oneness of God and informs the preferred 
self-description of those who follow the 
teachings of the religious reformer 
Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab as ahl-tawhid 
or al-muwahidun (“those who profess the 
oneness of God”).12 This sets them apart from 
those Sunnis and Shi’a whom they regard as 
engaging in religious practices, which put 
them outside of the strict monotheism 
prescribed by the Wahhabi understanding of 
Islam and whom they condemn as Ahl al-shirk 
or al-mushrikun (those who believe in more 
than one God) or even Ahl al-ridda 
(apostates).13 The hostility toward Shi’i 
religious thought and practice among some 
members of Saudi Arabia’s religious elite also 
meant that they did not follow the lead of 
Egypt’s al-Azhar when it officially accepted 
Shi’i Islam as the fifth school of law in Islam 
in addition to the four Sunni schools in 1959.14 
King Abdallah’s announcement in spring 2008 
to hold an interreligious summit of the three 
monotheistic religions was therefore as 
favorably received abroad as it raised concerns 
at home.15 
It is against this historical background that 
those Saudi religious scholars skeptical about 
the idea of reconciliation with Shi’i Islam or 
other faiths felt emboldened by the return of 
the idea of a Shi’a threat. Two clerics, in 
particular, have recently received attention for 
the fact that their anti-Shi’a views nicely 
dovetailed with a general Saudi interest in 
delegitimizing Iranian power projection 
attempts in the Arab world. 
While Shaykh Safar al-Hawali supports the 
Saudi regime against the domestic Islamist 
terrorist threat, he is also known for his radical 
views on the West, which have earned him a 
place in Samuel P. Huntington’s original 
article about a purported “clash of 
civilizations” and an honorable mentioning in 
Usama bin Ladin’s declaration of war in 
1996.16 Based on his belief in the 
inescapability of a war between Islam and the 
West, he rejected the 1991 Madrid peace 
conference as a thinly veiled Israeli attempt to 
dominate the region and stressed the need to 
educate Muslim youth about the threat posed 
by “evil Jews.” In the context of the 1991 
Shi’a uprising in Southern Iraq, al-Hawali 
published his book, Kissinger’s Promise and 
the American Aims in the Gulf, in which he 
elaborated on the threat posed by the al-qaws 
al-rafidi (the arc of “those who reject 
legitimate authority,” i.e. the Shi’a), to which 
he also counted the ruling Alawites of Syria.17 
Al-Hawali’s animosity toward the Shi’a 
came in very handy when Riyadh was felt 
forced to stem the tide of rising approval for 
Hizballah among the broader Arab public in 
the context of the 2006 war with Israel. Not 
only was Saudi Arabia the first Arab country 
to condemn Hizballah leader Hassan 
Nasrallah; the increasing concern of Jordan, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia over Iran’s role in the 
region became apparent when these countries-
-over the objections of Yemen, Syria, Algeria, 
Lebanon, and Qatar--jointly denounced 
Hizballah’s “adventurism” for threatening 
“Arab interests.”18 At this point, Safar al-
Hawali chipped in with a fatwa (religious 
edict) in which he declared it a sin to support 
or pray for Hizballah. He thereby echoed a 
similar fatwa issued by Shaykh Ibn Jibrin who 
described the Shi’a as “enemies of Islam.” Ibn 
Jibrin had earlier issued fatwas that stated that 
the Shi’a could not become butchers because 
the meat they cut was not halal and that they 
should not be allowed to marry Sunnis. He 
also claimed that because the Shi’a posed a 
greater threat to Islam than Christians and 
Jews, killing a Shi’a would bring greater 
reward in heaven than killing a Christian or 
Jew.19 
Such statements were not without impact. 
Data contained in annual polls of Arab public 
opinion undertaken by Prof. Shibley Telhami 
at the University of Maryland show that the 
Saudi government and its allies have been able 
to curb the enthusiasm for Hizballah and Iran. 
When asked to name two “world leaders you 
admire most,” the percentage of Saudi citizens 
who named either Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or 
Hassan Nasrallah dropped considerably from 
16 to 4 percent and 22 to 9 percent 
respectively from 2008 to 2009. This mirrors 
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similar developments in Egypt where support 
for Nasrallah dropped rather dramatically from 
33 to 6 percent and for Ahmadinejad from 16 
to 3 percent.20 
These successes in shoring up support for 
the current order at the expense of alternative 
ideologies, however, come with a price. From 
the perspective of Western security interests, 
domestic support for anti-Shi’a rhetoric diverts 
attention from the fact that Sunni extremists 
constitute a greater threat to governments and 
civilians in the Arab and Western world alike. 
In fact, as seen above, it even emboldens 
those who provide the underlying ideology. 
This raises questions about the utility of 
Realist-inspired Cold War analogies when it 
comes to the Arab world’s relationship with 
Iran. As Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh observe, in 
the Cold War, containing Communism “meant 
promoting capitalism and democracy. 
Containing Iran today would mean promoting 
Sunni extremism--a self-defeating proposition 
for Washington.”21 
The second problem stems from the fact 
that reformers in Saudi Arabia within the 
ruling family and outside fear that the image 
of a Shi’a threat plays into the hands of the 
Wahhabi hardliners and thus help preempt 
chances of political reform. For instance, the 
rhetorical emboldening of religious 
conservatives makes it harder to push through 
the kind of reforms King Abdallah deems 
necessary, especially in the field of education, 
which has suffered from a history of 
indoctrinating young Saudis with images of 
perceived foreign enemies whether Jewish, 
Christian, or Shi’a.22 In January 2004, for 
example, Safar al-Hawali and Abdallah bin 
Jibrin were among 156 religious scholars and 
university professors who declared that a 
curriculum reform would “take the kingdom 
along the path of infidels” and that “any 
omission or mutilation of what was written by 
the Islamic scholars… contradicts the national 
unity the state is calling for, as this unity is 
based on our religious creed.”23 
In the end, some conservative political and 
religious elites in Saudi Arabia and Iran share-
-either at the level of reinforcing domestic 
authoritarian structures or at the level of 
gathering of support for their foreign policy 
interests--a common interest in upholding and 
further politicizing the Shi’i-Sunni divide. As 
other observers have already pointed out, the 
long-term beneficiary of any such short-term 
rhetorical escalation will be Iran. They 
maintain that the worsening political climate 
between Shi’a and Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain has mostly been the result of 
decreased U.S. pressure to liberalize their 
political systems in the face of U.S. 
preoccupation with the perceived Iranian 
threat.24 It is only through the marginalization 
of their Shi’a subjects that Arab rulers help lay 
the groundwork for possible Iranian influence. 
Otherwise, Tehran suffers from the low 
attractiveness of a political and social model, 
which was further put into question by the 
harsh crackdown on peaceful opposition in the 
context of the disputed Iranian presidential 
elections in June 2009. 
 
Iran’s Nuclear Program 
 
In 2003, the British Guardian newspaper 
reported that Saudi Arabia had produced an 
internal strategy document that outlined three 
possible scenarios on nuclear weapons: to 
maintain or enter into an alliance with an 
existing nuclear power that would offer 
protection; to try to reach a regional agreement 
on having a nuclear-free Middle East; to 
acquire a nuclear capability as a deterrent.25 
The first option hinges on the trust the 
Saudi leadership puts into U.S. nuclear 
deterrence. In fact, a report presented to 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
February 2008 stated that only a marked 
improvement in its bilateral relationship with 
the United States could prevent Saudi Arabia 
from obtaining its own nuclear device in 
response to a possible Iranian weapon.26 It 
remains to be seen whether President Obama’s 
efforts to reach out to Saudi Arabia as 
exemplified by his decision to grant his first 
interview as a sitting president to the Saudi 
owned al-Arabiyya TV news channel can offer 
sufficient reassurance. The decision to 
nominate James B. Smith, a retired air force 
brigadier general who flew combat sorties 
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during Desert Storm and worked for major 
U.S. defense contractors Raytheon and 
Lockheed Martin, to be President Obama’s 
first ambassador to Saudi Arabia can be 
interpreted as another attempt to solidify the 
security links between Washington and 
Riyadh.27 
While former Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III recently suggested that the United 
States should extend its nuclear umbrella to 
Israel, Turkey, and its Arab allies--an idea 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly 
endorsed in July 2009--others have already 
pointed to a perceived lack of U.S. credibility 
with regard to nuclear deterrence. They point 
out that during the Cold War, the forward 
positioning of U.S. nuclear weapons served to 
make deterrence credible since their use would 
become inevitable in times of conflict to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of the 
Soviet Union. In the Gulf, a similar posture is 
hardly conceivable given the strong popular 
resentment against U.S. military presence, 
which that would entail.28  
The second option would thus appear to be 
a push for a regional nuclear-weapons-free 
zone. Here, the clear escalation in the official 
oratory of a number of Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) leaders seems to indicate a 
growing skepticism toward this approach. In 
December 2005, GCC Secretary-General Abd 
al-Rahman al-Attiya had announced an 
initiative to declare the Gulf--including Iran, 
Iraq, and Yemen--to be a nuclear-weapons-
free zone.29 Yet, at this point, the GCC states 
failed to mention Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a 
main concern in their final statement and 
followed Amr Musa, the Secretary General of 
the Arab League, in focusing their 
condemnation on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. 
Only in May 2006 did the GCC leaders issue a 
relatively tough statement after an 
extraordinary summit on the situation in Iraq 
and Iran. In 2007, a GCC summit finally 
sponsored a joint resolution to study the 
nuclear issue in “all its dimensions.”30 
From a Saudi perspective, an easier way to 
address adequately the perceived need to 
contain and ultimately deter Iran while 
protecting its domestic legitimacy would be 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In case 
Israel reacted to Iranian nuclear weapons 
production by officially declaring its nuclear 
weapons status, it would become a matter of 
national pride and regional influence for Saudi 
Arabia to be the first Arab state to achieve the 
same nuclear weapons capacity as the two 
non-Arab regional nuclear powers. This might 
explain why, for instance, in December 2007, 
52 percent of Saudis indicated that they would 
favor their country developing nuclear 
weapons.31 
It would not be the first time Saudi Arabia 
has demonstrated the willingness to defy 
Washington’s proliferation concerns. In the 
late 1980s, Riyadh procured Chinese CSS-2 
missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons nearly everywhere in the immediate 
neighborhood. There are now reports that 
Saudi Arabia might obtain either the 600 km 
range CSS-6 or the 1800 km range CSS-5 
from China or a new intermediate-range 
missile, Ghauri, from Pakistan.32 In this 
context, developments in the neighboring 
United Arab Emirates are noteworthy. The 
Obama administration is set to implement a 
nuclear deal with the UAE, which was 
negotiated in the final stages of the Bush 
administration. It would see Washington 
sharing expertise, technology, and fuel in 
exchange for the promise to abide by 
international safeguards and to refrain from 
uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing. The prospect of U.S. businesses 
receiving a major share of the eventual $41 
billion project meant that even the emergence 
of a video showing Shaykh Issa bin Zayid al-
Nahyan torturing an Afghan grain merchant 
would not derail Congressional ratification.33 
This deal, the first of its kind between a GCC 
member country and the United States, has 
found political support on both sides of 
Washington’s political divide as a role model 
of what is possible with regard to the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy by a Muslim country. As 
diverse commentators as Elliott Abrams--who 
served as deputy assistant to the president and 
deputy national security adviser in President 
George W. Bush's administration--and Jon 
Wolfsthal--special adviser on WMD and non-
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proliferation issues to Vice President Biden--
hailed the agreement with the UAE as 
providing an Arab counterexample to Iran’s 
position.34 It could also serve as a template for 
a similar agreement between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia, whose lobby in Washington 
can point to Riyadh’s reported intention to 
spend $400 billion on a general upgrading of 
the country’s infrastructure and technological 
capabilities.35 
Criticism of what some deem as neglect of 
the military dimension of the Arab world’s 
sudden interest in nuclear energy comes from 
John Cirincione, formerly Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and the 
Center for American Progress and now 
president of Ploughshare Fund that campaigns 
for a nuclear weapons free world: “I have a 
hard time believing that Middle East leaders 
got together to watch Al Gore's movie and 
decided to reduce their carbon footprint. This 
is not about energy. It is about Iran.”36 Against 
the background of the black market activities 
of A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear 
program, in Dubai, the fact that the UAE’s 
commitment not to engage in sensitive nuclear 
activities such as nuclear-fuel production is 
not based on legally binding language is of 
concern to other non-proliferation experts as 
well.37 
Again, surveys of public opinion in Saudi 
Arabia offer noteworthy insights. In general, 
the Saudi public has grown increasingly 
concerned about the nature of Iran’s nuclear 
program and pluralities are even prepared to 
condone military attacks on Iranian nuclear 
installations. The 2009 annual public opinion 
poll conducted by Shibley Telhami’s team at 
the University of Maryland shows that the 
public in Saudi Arabia (52 percent) sides with 
those in Egypt (63 percent) and Morocco (62 
percent) who are convinced that Iran is aiming 
for nuclear weapons. This contrasts with the 
UAE (36 percent), Lebanon (31 percent), and 
Jordan (19 percent), where only minorities 
hold this view. From 2008 to 2009, the 
percentage of Saudis who thought that Iran 
should be pressured to give up its nuclear 
program jumped from 27 to 41 percent, 
following a similar pattern as in the UAE 
(from 34 to 62 percent), Egypt (17 to 43 
percent), and Morocco (31 to 40 percent). This 
goes hand in hand with an increase in the 
number of those who worry in Saudi Arabia 
(26 to 48 percent), the UAE (42 to 60 percent), 
but also in Egypt (28 to 48 percent) and 
Morocco (35 to 49 percent) that an Iranian 
nuclear weapons status could have negative 
consequences for the Middle East.38 Even 
before this anti-Iranian hardening of public 
opinion, 38 percent of Saudis interviewed in a 
2007 poll favored “the United States and other 
countries” to take military action against Iran 
in case diplomatic means failed to stop a 
possible nuclear weapons program.39 
In essence, one could read these numbers as 
an early indication that these pro-Western 
regimes have managed to initiate a process 
that could see a reframing of the Iranian 
challenge. Iran is now less often seen as a 
Muslim nation standing up to perceived 
Western imperialism and more often as an 
irresponsible threat to the regional order. This 
means that countries in the region, and the 
GCC in particular, might be able to weather 
the domestic political fallout from an Israeli 
attack on Iranian installations if they cannot be 
accused of complicity. The July 2009 reports 
claiming that Mossad director Meir Dagan 
received the tacit Saudi agreement to Israeli 
warplanes flying over its territory on the way 
to attacking Iranian nuclear sites, therefore, do 
not come as a surprise.40 
 
The Role of the United States 
 
U.S.-Saudi relations are based on the 
exchange of Western access to reasonably 
cheap oil for the protection of the Saudi 
kingdom against domestic and external foes. 
This makes the status of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict less of a factor in the bilateral 
relationship than is the case with regard to the 
relations between Washington and Cairo, 
where it very much forms the essence. 
However, Israel’s role is not unimportant. 
King Abdallah’s 2002 peace initiative was not 
only motivated by genuine concern about the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, but also the interest in 
putting the relationship with Washington on a 
Lars Berger 
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more secure post September 11 footing.41 
However, Riyadh is also concerned about the 
conflict in its own right. Following a general 
pattern observable in the Middle East,42 Saudi 
Arabian foreign policy is not solely 
determined by external threat perceptions, but 
also by calculations about how best to 
preserve the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic 
legitimacy. Since much of it rests to a not 
negligible extent on the al-Sa’ud’s role as 
“guardians” of the two holy places in Mecca 
and Medina, Riyadh has to demonstrate 
particular concern about the status of Islam’s 
third holiest site, the al-Aqsa Mosque in 
Jerusalem.43  
The increasing skill with which Iran has 
shown to be able to “play the Arab street” 
resembles the threat to domestic legitimacy 
posed by Nasser to the conservative 
monarchies of his time. Some argue therefore 
that the main threat from Iran to Saudi Arabia 
is not through direct confrontation but through 
undermining its domestic legitimacy through 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.44 Saudi foreign 
minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal admitted as 
much when he claimed that “Israel is the key 
for Iran to enter the Arab world. If Iran 
threatens the Arab world, it is threatening it 
through problems that arise out of the Arab-
Israeli conflict.”45 Thus, any overt realignment 
with Israel against Iran could further 
exacerbate the al-Sa’ud’s domestic legitimacy 
problem if they cannot show some kind of 
movement on issues relating to the conflict 
between Israelis and Palestinians. 
At this point, the irony of a hypothetical 
Israeli-Saudi cooperation on the Iranian issue 
becomes obvious. Observers on each side 
hope that the mutual concern over Tehran and 
the shared link with Washington are enough to 
nudge the respective other into a direction 
more in line with the own preferred strategic 
outlook, be it greater U.S. pressure on Saudi 
Arabia to confront Iran or initiate Arab 
normalization with Israel or greater U.S. 
pressure on Israel regarding the conflict with 
the Palestinians. Here, the early steps taken by 
the new U.S. administration indicate that its 
regional outlook is much closer to Arab claims 
about the supposed interconnectedness of 
regional conflicts than was the case with the 
Bush administration, which always rejected 
such links. The fact that Ray Takeyh just 
became the special adviser for the Gulf and 
Southwest Asia at the U.S. Department of 
State is important because he has been an early 
proponent of engagement with Iran and argued 
explicitly against a new version of Cold War 
in Middle East. His views are similar to those 
of National Security Adviser General Jim 
Jones and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
whose understanding of Middle East politics is 
very much in line with the views expressed in 
the Iraq Study Group report of 2006, which 
Gates helped coauthor. There, its authors 
stressed that “[t]he United States cannot 
achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it 
deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and regional instability.”46 In October 2008, 
General Jones told a Department of Defense 
newsletter that “nothing is more important” to 
regional security than the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.47 By granting his first interview as a 
sitting president to the Saudi owned pan-Arab 
satellite TV station al-Arabiyya, President 
Obama already indicated that the Middle East 
would feature prominently on his foreign 
policy agenda. In the interview, Obama 
praised the peace plan, which then Crown 
Prince Abdallah had launched in 2002.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The strong influence of domestic 
calculations puts distinct limitations on the 
establishment of a broader cooperation 
between Israel and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis the 
perceived Iranian threat aside from tactical 
behind-the-scenes military and intelligence 
coordination. The fact that, at the moment, 
Iran’s threat to pro-Western regimes is more 
on the level of domestic legitimacy than 
national security for Saudi-Arabia makes it 
less attractive for them to realign with Israel 
overtly. For Western policymakers, the overt 
emphasis on the perceived Shi’a threat is 
worrisome because it plays into the hands of 
the Sunni extremists who currently pose a 
more direct threat to Western countries and 
regional security and weakens those reformers 
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whose influence is needed to counter radical 
Islamist narratives.  
With regard to the threat posed by Iran’s 
possible development of nuclear weapons, the 
usually cautious leadership in Riyadh can 
count on the fact that the diversification of 
security arrangements with outside factors, the 
reliance on the protection offered by the 
United States or, ultimately, free-riding on 
unilateral Israeli military action present safer 
options than a dramatic move with regard to 
Israel. The specter of increasing domestic 
support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
thus serves as an additional Saudi leverage in 
pressuring international actors with a broader 
range of political and military tools at their 
disposal to find a solution in line with Saudi 
concerns. 
 
*Dr. Lars Berger is a Lecturer in Politics and 
Contemporary History of the Middle East at 
Salford University/Greater Manchester, UK; 
M.A. (2002), Ph.D. (2006) from Friedrich-
Schiller University Jena/Germany. He was the 
2002/2003 APSA Congressional Fellow in 
Washington, DC. In 2007, he received the 
German Middle East Studies Association 
(DAVO) award for best Ph.D. dissertation on 
the impact of Islamist terrorism on U.S. 
relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 
 
NOTES 
                                                           
1
 For a modified version of Neo-Realism, 
which takes into account threat perceptions to 
analyze alliance patterns in the Middle East, 
see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of 
Alliances, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1994). 
2
 Lars Berger, Die USA und der islamistische 
Terrorismus. Herausforderungen im Nahen 
und Mittleren Osten (Paderborn: Schoeningh, 
2007). 
3
 Shireen T. Hunter, The Future of Islam and 
the West: Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful 
Coexistence? (Westport: Praeger, 1998), p. 15. 
4
 Madawi al-Rasheed, “The Shia of Saudi 
Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural 
Authenticity,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (May 1998). 
                                                                                           
5
 Robert F. Worth, “Foreign Money Seeks to 
Buy Lebanese Votes,” New York Times, April 
22, 2009. 
6
 Peter Finn, “Al Qaeda is Trying to Open Iraq 
Front,” Washington Post, September 7, 2003; 
Dana Priest and Susan Schmidt, “Al Qaeda 
Figure Tied to Riyadh Blasts,” Washington 
Post, May 18, 2003. 
7
 Robert F. Worth, “Saudis Issue List of 85 
Terrorism Suspects,” New York Times, 
February 4, 2009. 
8
 Frederic Wehrey et.al., Dangerous But Not 
Omnipotent. Exploring the Reach and 
Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle 
East (Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), pp. 19-20. 
9
 Anoush Ehteshami and Steven Wright, 
“Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: 
From Liberalization to Enfranchisement,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, p. 918; 
Daniel Neep, “Dilemmas of Democratization 
in the Middle East: The ‘Forward Strategy of 
Freedom,’” Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 
3, p. 82; Graham Fuller, Islamist Politics in 
Iraq after Saddam Hussein, United States 
Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 108 
(August 2003), p. 7. 
10
 Iris Glosemeyer, “Checks, Balances and 
Transformation in the Saudi Political System,” 
in Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (eds.), 
Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political 
Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (London: 
Hurst, 2005), pp. 223-24. 
11
 Joseph Kechichian, “Democratization in 
Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the 
GCC,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4 
(Winter 2004), p. 43. 
12
 Michael Scott Doran, “The Saudi Paradox”, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 
(January/February 2004), p. 35-38. 
13
 Esther Peskes, Muhammad B. 
´Abdalwahhāb (1703-92) im Widerstreit: 
Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der 
Frühgeschichte der Wahhābīya (Stuttgart: 
Steiner, 1993), pp. 9-15. 
14
 Gudrun Krämer, “Good Counsel to the 
King: The Islamist Opposition in Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco,” in Joseph 
Kostiner (ed.), Middle East Monarchies: The 
Lars Berger 
32                                 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2009) 
                                                                                           
Challenge of Modernity (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000), p. 268 
15
 Caryle Murphy, “What's Behind the Saudi 
Monotheism Summit?,” Religion News 
Service, April 8, 2008. 
16
 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of 
Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 
22 (Summer 1993), p. 35; PBS Newshour, Bin 
Laden’s Fatwa, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/intern
ational/fatwa_1996.html. 
17
 Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the 
Politics of Dissent (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1999), pp. 140-41; Mai Yamani, “The Two 
Faces of Saudi Arabia,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 
1 (February 2008), p. 151. 
18
 Hassan M. Fattah, “Militia Rebuked by 
Some Arab Countries,” New York Times, July 
17, 2006. 
19
 Yamani, “The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia”, 
pp. 147-52; Faiza Ambah, “Arab Leaders, 
Unlike Much of Public, Uneasy About 
Hezbollah,” Washington Post, July 24, 2006. 
20
 The author would like to thank Professor 
Shibley Telhami and Mike Lebson for the kind 
provision of country-specific data. Aggregated 
regional data can be found at 
http://www.sadat.umd.edu/.  
21
 Vali Nasr, Ray Takeyh, “The Costs of 
Containing Iran: Washington’s Misguided 
New Middle East Policy,” Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 87, No. 1 (January/February 2008), p. 91. 
22
 Simon Henderson, Saudi Arabia Changes 
Course, Slowly, Policy Watch No. 1479, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
February 18, 2009. 
23
 Michaela Prokop, “The War of Ideas: 
Education in Saudi Arabia”, in Aarts, 
Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in the Balance, p. 
80. 
24
 Wehrey et. al., Dangerous But Not 
Omnipotent, p. 151. 
25
 Ewen MacAskill and Ian Traynor, “Saudis 
Consider Nuclear Bomb,” The Guardian, 
September 18, 2003. 
26
 United States Senate, “Chain Reaction: 
Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle 
East, Report to the Committee on Foreign 
                                                                                           
Relations,” Committee on Foreign Relations, 
110th Congress, 2nd Session, February 2008. 
27
 Ulf Laessing, “Democracy Falls by Wayside 
As US Looks to Foster Ties with Saudi 
Arabia,” The Daily Star, July 2, 2009. 
28
 David Sanger, “Clinton Says Nuclear Aim 
of Iran Is Fruitless”, New York Times, July 26, 
2009; Brent Gardner-Smith, “Baker Suggests 
Rattling Nukes at Iran,” Aspen Daily News, 
July 3, 2009; Kathleen McInnis, “Extended 
Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the 
Middle East,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, 
No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 180. 
29
 Mustafa Alani, “The Gulf NW and WMD 
Free Zone: A Track II Initiative,” 
International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 
358-59. 
30
 “The Nuclear Race,” American Foreign 
Policy Interests, Vol. 30, No. 3 (May 2008), p. 
179. 
31
 Results of a New Nationwide Public 
Opinion Survey of Saudi Arabia, Terror Free 
Tomorrow (2007), 
http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org, p. 12. 
32
 Thomas Woodrow, “The Sino-Saudi 
Connection,” China Brief, Vol. 2, No. 21, 
Jamestown Foundation, October 24, 2002, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrie
f/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=20580&
tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=192&no_cache=
1; see also Harsh V. Pant, “Saudi Arabia Woos 
China and India,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 
13, No. 4, pp. 45-52, 
http://www.meforum.org/1019/saudi-arabia-
woos-china-and-india. 
33
 Robert Worth, “Videotape Complicates U.S. 
Deal with Emirates,” The New York Times, 
May 1, 2009. 
34
 Elliott Abrams, “An Arab Counterexample,” 
The Washington Times, April 24, 2009. 
35
 Laessing, “Democracy Falls by Wayside.” 
36
 Joseph Cirincione, “Chain Reaction,” 
ForeignPolicy.com, May 2009, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?
story_id=4915. 
37
 Henry Sokolski, “Nuclear Dealing,” 
National Review Online, March 25, 2009, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=Mz
Iran and the Arab World: A View from Riyadh 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 2009)                                 33 
                                                                                           
RhYTc2OWY0MzY4ZDgxZmRkMDA4ZDQ
zMjJhNzE4MWY. 
38
 Aggregated regional data can be found at 
http://www.sadat.umd.edu/. 
39
 Terror Free Tomorrow, p. 39. 
40
 Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, “Saudis 
Give Nod to Israeli Raid on Iran,” Sunday 
Times, July 5, 2009. 
41
 Joseph Kostiner, “Coping with Regional 
Challenges: A Case Study of Crown Prince 
Abdullah’s Peace Initiative,” in Aarts and 
Nonneman (eds.), Saudi Arabia in the 
Balance, pp. 352-71. 
42
 Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances 
in the Middle East,” in: Peter J. Katzenstein 
(ed.), The Culture of National Security. Norms 
and Identity in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400-47. 
43
 F. Gregory Gause III, “The Foreign Policy 
of Saudi Arabia,” in Raymond Hinnebusch 
and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The 
Foreign Policies of Middle East States 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); 
Hermann Frederick Eilts, “Saudi Arabia’s 
Foreign Policy,” in L. Carl Brown (ed.), 
Diplomacy in the Middle East: The 
International Relations of Regional and 
Outside Powers (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001). 
44
 Wehrey et.al., Dangerous But Not 
Omnipotent, p. 15. 
45
 Christopher Dickey, “War, Peace and a 
Political Touch,” Newsweek Web Exclusive, 
June 9, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/201430. 
46
 United States Institute for Peace, Iraq Study 
Group Report (Washington, DC: 2006), 
http://www.usip.org, p. 7. 
47
 Elie Lake, “Conflict Zone. Will James Jones 
and Hillary Clinton Butt Heads over Middle 
East Policy?,” The New Republic, November 
26, 2008. 
